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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme court had appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78A-3-102(3) (j), because this appeal is from an order "over which the 
Court of Appeals does not ha\e original appellate jurisdiction." Namely, this is an appeal 
of the District Court's dismissal of Wasatch County's petition for de novo review of a 
formal hearing held before the State Tax Commission. The Tax Commission's decision 
is included as Exhibit 1. The District Court's decision is included as Exhibit 2. The 
Supreme Court poured this appeal over to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court now has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the District Court properly found that Wasatch County's protective filing 
of a cross-petition for review in the Supreme Court deprived the District Court of subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the County's petition for review filed in District Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 59-1-602? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has stated, "A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presents a 
question of law, which we review for correctness." Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 
2005 UT App 4914 7, 128 P.3d 31. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
A. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 6(4): 
"Notw ithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in this 
Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize any court established under 
Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any malter decided 
by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and taxation." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
A. Utah Code Section 59-1-601 (District court jurisdiction over appeals from Tax 
Commission). Attached as Exhibit 3. 
B. Utah Code Section 59-1-602 (Right to appeal - Venue - County as party in 
interest). Attached as Exhibit 3. 
C. Rule 1(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
"If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an order of 
an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the state which is 
inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the statute shall govern, [n other 
respects, these rules shall apply to such appeals or reviews." 
D. Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Attached as Exhibit 4. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Third District Court, Judge John Paul 
Kennedy presiding, issued August 1, 2008, dismissing Wasatch County's Petition for 
Review on jurisdictional grounds. This Order is attached as Exhibit 2. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This case originated at the Utah State Tax Commission, where a formal hearing 
was held on December 18th and 19th, 2007. The commission issued its written Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision on April 1, 2008. This decision is 
attached as Exhibit 1. Wasatch County appealed this decision to the District Court for a 
de novo review, pursuant to Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 59-1-602, on April 25, 
2008. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court and Agency 
The District Court dismissed the County's request for a de novo review, 
concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
This case originated in the Utah State Tax Commission. The tax appeals of the 
owners of seven parcels of property within Wasatch County were consolidated by the 
commission and a formal hearing was held on the consolidated case on December 18th 
and 19 ,2007. The commission issued its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Decision on April 1, 2008. Record at 9 to 33; Exhibit 1. 
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First Appeal—Supreme Court 
On April 10, 2008, the property owners filed a Petition for Review in the Utah 
Supreme Court under case number 20080304. This case was subsequently poured over to 
the Court of Appeals and is being briefed simultaneous with the present case. A copy of 
the Petition for Review in case number 20080304 was not provided at the time of filing to 
Wasatch County. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, by letter, notified Wasatch County 
of the property owners' petition, and counsel subsequently provided a courtesy copy of 
the same. Thereafter, in order to preserve its rights to affirmatively participate in the 
property owners' supreme court appeal, Wasatch County filed a Cross-Petition for 
Review with the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008. 
Second Appeal—District Court 
The next day, on April 25, 2008, Wasatch County filed a Petition for Judicial 
Review by trial de novo, with the Fourth District Court, in and for Wasatch County, 
pursuant to Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 602. Record at 1 to 7. The case was 
initially assigned the case number 080500192. Id. On May 5, 2008, the Tax 
Commission, through counsel, requested assignment of the case to a tax judge pursuant to 
Rule 6-103 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Record at 37. The case was 
then transferred to the Third District Court, where it was assigned to Judge John Paul 
Kennedy and given the new case number of 080907392. 
The owners of one of the parcels of property, Warren and Tricia Osborn ("the 
Osborns"), moved to intervene in the district court appeal and also moved to dismiss the 
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district court appeal for failure to join them as parties to the appeal. Record at 2 and 7. 
Wasatch County and the Tax Commission agreed that, under the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Osborns had no need either to intervene or to be "joined" in order to 
participate in the County's district court appeal because they were already parties to the 
case below. Record at 85-102 and 153-157. The district court agreed and allowed the 
Osborns to participate in the case without an intervention or joinder. Record at 204. 
At oral arguments on the Osborns' above-mentioned motions, counsel for the 
Osborns mentioned for the first time that there was "an issue" as to whether the county 
was entitled to exercise its right to district court review because the county had also 
elected to simultaneously participate in the Osborns' supreme court appeal arising from 
the same Tax Commission decision. Record at 187 (an unofficial transcript of the 
hearing prepared by Osborns' counsel). The court asked the parties to brief that issue and 
scheduled another hearing to address it. Record at 138. 
At the scheduled hearing, the district court, without hearing argument, dismissed 
the County's appeal on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and "referred 
[the matter] back to the Appellate Court." Record at 202. In so ruling, the district court 
felt that Salt Lake County v. Tax Comm '/*, 596 P.2d 641 (Utah 1979) was dispositive. 
Exhibit 2 at 3-4; Record at 205-06. The Osborns' counsel subsequently prepared an 
Order for the court and mailed it to counsel on or about July 29, 2008. Record at 207. 
Apparently, the Order was simultaneously submitted to the district court, which executed 
1
 The Record starts over at page 1 after the first 39 pages of it. Therefore, the page numbers 1 
through 39 are used twice in the Record. This citation is to the second page numbers 2 and 7. 
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the Order without the benefit of counsel's review on August 1, 2008. The Order, as 
prepared by counsel and signed by the court, bases the dismissal on the fact that the 
county had cross-petitioned in the Osboms' supreme court appeal and thereby foreclosed 
its opportunity to appeal to the district court. 
The present appeal constitutes the county's appeal from this Order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah law accords all parties to a Tax Commission decision the right to choose 
whether to seek a record-review by the Utah Supreme Court or a de novo review by a 
district court. It does not, however, provide guidance for handling a disagreement among 
the parties as to which appellate path to take. Nevertheless, no statute allows one party's 
selection of one option to preempt another party's selection of another. Nor does a 
statute prohibit a party from both protecting its standing in one appeal filed in the 
supreme court by an opposing party and also seeking de novo review in a district court. 
Instead, the only requirement under the law is that all petitions for review, in whatever 
court, be filed within 30 days of the commission's decision. Wasatch County followed 
these rules precisely in initiating its district court review. 
The right to obtain district court review is an important one. It was preserved 
through the cooperative efforts of the people and their legislators through a constitutional 
amendment and the reenactment of judicially invalidated legislation. It discourages a 
competitive and secretive race to the courthouse. It promotes the efficient use of judicial 
resources by ensuring that factual issues are fully developed, to the satisfaction of the 
parties, before the appellate courts conduct their review. And it also allows the appellate 
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courts the benefit of a district court's review of the legal issues involved in a tax 
commission decision. For all of these reasons, even if there were any ambiguities in the 
statute authorizing district court review, such ambiguities should be construed with an 
eye towards preserving the right to district court review, and not eviscerating it. 
I 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. ALL PARTIES TO A TAX COMMISSION DECISION ARE GIVEN THE 
OPTION OF APPEALING TO THE COURT OF THEIR CHOICE; AND NO 
PARTY'S EXERCISE OF THAT OPTION CAN EXTINGUISH ANOTHER'S. 
Utah Code Section 59-1-602 (emphasis added) provides as follows: 
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county 
whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's 
option petition for judicial review in the district court pursuant to this 
section, or in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Section 59-1-610. 
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in 
the district is in the district court located in the county of residence or 
principal place of business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a 
taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review made 
to the district court under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being 
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reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before 
the court. 
Subsection (l)(a) of this statute authorizes all parties to a Tax Commission 
decision to choose the venue of their appeal therefrom—either the district court or the 
supreme court. However, while this statute is generous in its delegation of discretion to 
the parties to choose the venue for their appeal, it is somewhat parsimonious in its 
guidance on how to sort through the conflicts that can arise from the parties' competing 
exercise of that discretion. For example, it does not provide instructions on how to 
proceed when different parties exercise different options. Neither does it resolve the 
issue of priority—i.e., which appeal should proceed first. Nor does it instruct on how to 
exercise one's right to appeal to one venue while also protecting one's standing in 
another party's appeal in a another venue. All it does is give every party an equal right to 
appeal to the court of its choice. 
While the statute may not provide guidance on how the courts should 
accommodate the exercise of competing appellate options, it certainly does not do what 
the appellees want it to do either. Namely, it does not provide a methodology for any 
party to extinguish another's right to exercise the appellate option of that party's choice. 
Under the present facts, the lower court found that because the county protected its 
standing in the appellees' supreme court appeal one day before it exercised its option to 
seek district court review, the county somehow forfeited its option to obtain that district 
court review. Of course, had the county protected its standing in the appellees' supreme 
court appeal one day after it exercised its option to seek district court review, appellees 
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would certainly have argued that the county had somehow mooted, abandoned, or 
I 
otherwise extinguished its district court review. Perhaps the appellees wrould submit that 
the county's only valid method of exercising its option to obtain district court review 
without losing its inherent rights to assert appellate issues in the appellees' supreme court 
appeal (which could potentially occur without the benefit of intermediate district court 
review) would be by filing in both courts at precisely the same moment. Or perhaps they 
would argue that it is simply impossible for the county—regardless of the timing of its 
filings—to participate in both fora simultaneously: if the county ever desired to assert 
appellate issues in the appellees' supreme court appeal then there was simply no way it 
could ever initiate its own district court appeal. Fortunately the statute, which is one that 
grants all parties equal but competing rights of appeal, does not mandate such an 
unforgiving procedure. 
Our supreme court has stated, "It is well settled in this court that our goal when 
interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the statute's 
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Summit Water 
Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ^ 17, 123 P.3d 437 (internal quotations 
omitted). Here, section 59-l-602(l)(a) is a right-granting statute, not a right-restricting 
one. It openly grants adverse parties a competing right to appeal to different courts. 
Therefore, it clearly contemplates that the exercise of those rights may not always be in 
harmony with each other: appeals from the same commission decision may be 
simultaneously filed, and heard, in different courts. It would be contrary to the purpose 
of this statute to construe it to prohibit parties from participating in their opponents' 
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appeals. In fact, beyond being contrary to the statute's purpose, as will be shown next, 
such an interpretation would also unreasonably require parties to forfeit appellate issues. 
Once an appeal from an administrative order is filed in any court, all parties below 
are automatically parties to the case on appeal, whether they want to be or not. 
Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm Vz, 2001 UT App 8, ^ J 3, 18 P.3d 519. And if any of 
these unwilling parties fails to file a timely cross-petition in their opponent's appeal, that 
opportunity is forever forfeited. Id. at ^ 7; see also Union Pacific Railroad v. State Tax 
Comm 7z, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17 (untimely petition from Tax Commission deprives 
court of jurisdiction); see also URAP 14(a) (requiring petitions for review to be filed 
within 30 days of the commission's order and to designate the part of the order to be 
reviewed). Thus, while the county would have preferred that the appellees not file their 
appeal in the supreme court (now pending in case number 20080304), once the appellees 
did so, the county was forced to either raise its appellate issues in that appeal or forever 
forfeit them, notwithstanding its preferred option of seeking district court review first. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[W]e have said that where a statute is 
subject to more than one construction, we can interpret it to make sense, and sustain it." 
Park and Recreation Comm 'n v. Dept. of Finance, 388 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah 1964). The 
lower court interpreted section 59-l-602(l)(a) to prohibit the county's filing in district 
court even though the county had not initiated the supreme court appeal. Not only does 
this interpretation of the statute ignore its accommodation of competing appeals from the 
same commission decision, but it turns that accommodation on its head: instead of 
allowing parties to choose for themselves where an appeal will be heard, it allows 
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opposing parties to co-opt that choice by racing to the courthouse." Once any party has 
selected a particular court for their appeal, under the lower court's interpretation, all other 
parties must either ignore their opponents' appeal—thereby forfeiting their appellate 
issues that must be raised only in their opponents' forum—or or they can preserve their 
appellate issues that must be raised in their opponents' forum and forever forfeit their 
own right to appeal to the court of their choice; they can never do both. Among the 
possible interpretations of the statute, this one would make the least sense. 
Where 59-l-602(l)(a) generously allows parties to disagree on the optimal 
appellate path to take from a commission decision, it would be contrary to this legislative 
intent to create a rule that artificially limits that discretion. The full absurdity of such a 
rule becomes apparent when one considers that many cases before the commission 
involve far more than two parties. In fact, even the present appeal involves seven 
property owners, the county, and the commission. Were the seven property owners not 
represented by the same law firm, it is conceivable that some of them would have opted 
to exercise their right to de novo district court review while others could have chosen to 
file directly with the supreme court. In such a circumstance, applying the lower court's 
reasoning, the county would have had the Hobson's choice of picking only one of the 
competing appeals in which to raise its own appellate issues. 
2
 In the present case, appellees filed their petition for review (in case number 20080304) 
in the supreme court nine days after the commission issued its decision and failed to 
notify or otherwise serve the county until a courtesy copy was provided attached to a 
letter several days later. This was probably a simple oversight. However, it betrays, 
somewhat, the possibility that there was just such a race to the courthouse in the present 
case. 
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This is an especially troublesome result where the nature of the appeals are 
different—i.e., one being a review of the record and the other being a trial de novo. 
Issues that are appropriate in a record review are, of course, different from those that are 
appropriate in a de novo review: the former has the potential to change the law of the 
case, and the latter has the potential to change the facts. Being forced to raise appellate 
issues in only one pending appeal to the exclusion of another can, colloquially speaking, 
leave a party winning one battle only to lose the war. 
To apply the statute fairly, this Court should do its part to give full meaning and 
benefit of the statute to all parties in a way that extinguishes no party's option. Here, the 
parties obviously disagree on the most appropriate forum for appeal from the Tax 
Commission decision. Appellees prefer to be in this Court; the county prefers to be in the 
district court. To fulfill the purpose of the statute by accommodating all parties' options 
in the present case, and extinguish none's, this Court should reinstate the county's district 
court appeal. Doing so does not detract from the appellees' right to appellate review by 
this Court; but it does preserve the county's right to de novo review by the district court. 
However, by declining to reinstate the county's district court appeal, this Court would 
sacrifice the county's right to obtain district court review merely to preserve the 
appellees' right to continue in their current appeal before this Court (in case number 
20080304), which right the appellees do not stand to lose anyway. 
For the foregoing reasons, if a rule is to be established that nullifies the right to 
appeal a Tax Commission decision to district court, then such a rule should be established 
in advance and by statute. It should not be created after the fact, by creative statutory 
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interpretation, and in a way that conflicts with the language and intent of the statute that 
confers that right. 
II. WASATCH COUNTY PROPERLY INVOKED THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
As stated above, section 59-l-602(l)(a) gives every party to a commission 
decision the right to appeal to the venue of its choice. Section 59-l-602(l)(c) describes 
how the choice to seek district court review is expressed. This subsection requires 
petitions for review "made to the district court under this section [to] conform to the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure." Rule 14 describes how to initiate such a review. See also 
URAP 1(c) ("If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an 
order of an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the state which is 
inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, 
these rules shall apply to such appeals or reviews."). It requires a "petition for review 
[to] be filed with the clerk of the appellate court," in this case the district court, "within 
the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within 30 days after 
the date of the written decision or order." URAP 14(a). The petition "shall designate . . . 
the order or decision, or part thereof to be reviewed." Id. Additional requirements are 
that the petition name the commission as the respondent, and that the petition be served 
upon the commission, "upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and 
upon the Attorney General of Utah." URAP 14(a) and (c). 
Wasatch County faithfully followed the requirements of section 59-l-602(l)(c) 
and Rule 14 to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. Upon receiving a decision 
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from the commission, the county, in reliance upon Utah law, exercised its right to petition 
the district court for review by following the plain language of the relevant statute and 
rule. No other requirements exist to invoke district court jurisdiction. Importantly, there 
is not even a requirement that no previous, protective cross-appeal have been filed in the 
supreme court. Therefore, where the county has complied with all of the procedures 
required to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, the district court enjoyed, and 
should have exercised, its jurisdiction over the county's petition. 
By properly following the procedures outlined in Rule 14 to invoke the district 
court's jurisdiction, the county has clearly and unequivocally expressed its "option" to 
have the district court conduct a de novo review. Indeed, there exists no confusion about 
the county's expression: it is not ambivalent, vague, or unclear. Instead, in order to 
dismiss the county's petition, the district court was required to deny the County's request 
despite its clarity, not because the court was confused about it. 
III. THE RIGHT TO A DE NOVO DISTRICT COURT REVIEW IS IMPORTANT, 
AND THE LEGISLATURE AND THE PEOPLE OF UTAH INTENDED TO 
PRESERVE ITS VIABILITY. 
Our supreme court has observed, "This court's primary responsibility in 
construing legislative enactments is to give effect to the legislature's underlying intent." 
Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm ft, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991). "In 
determining the legislative intent of a statute, the statute should be considered in the light 
of the purpose it was designed to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if it can 
be done consistent with its language." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
The people of Utah and their legislature have found the importance of a de novo 
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district court review sufficiently important that they preserved it through a constitutional 
amendment. In 1997, the Utah Supreme Court held Utah Code Section 59-1-601 
I 
unconstitutional because it authorized district courts to conduct a de novo review of Tax 
Commission decisions in violation of the Utah Constitution as it then existed. Evans & 
Sutherland v. Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997). Responding to Evans & 
Sutherland, the people of Utah amended the Utah Constitution in 1998 to authorize de 
novo review in district court. That authorization has survived subsequent amendments to 
the Utah Constitution and is currently found in Article XIII, Section 6(4). The Utah 
legislature simultaneously (in 1998) re-adopted section 59-1-601. The Court can 
conclude, from this history, that the people of Utah and their legislature consider the right 
to de novo district court review to be an important one, and that they intended to preserve 
that right through constitutional amendment and legislative processes. 
Ironically, the case found and cited by the district court in dismissing the county's 
de novo review also supports the historical importance of the de novo district court 
review. In Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission, 596 P.2d 641 (Utah 1979), Salt Lake 
County appealed a commission decision directly to the Utah Supreme Court. The law at 
the time allowed parties "aggrieved by a decision of the commission . . . to choose to 
waive the right of review by the tax division of the district court and apply for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court in which event such party must state in the application for 
the writ that the party is waiving the right of review and trial de novo in the tax division 
of the district court." 596 P.2d 644-45 (concurrence of Croft, District Judge). The court 
noted that the county had failed, in its pleadings before the supreme court, to expressly 
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waive its right to de novo district court review. 596 P.2d at 644. Nevertheless, the court 
treated that failure as a "pleading deficiency of the kind to which the pleader's adversary 
must make timely objection or the right to object is waived." Id. 
Far from supporting the dismissal of the County's district court review, Salt Lake 
County shows that, historically, the de novo district court review was, if anything, 
legislatively preferred over a direct supreme court review. This same legislative 
preference for the availability of a de novo review pervades the current statutory 
framework, which, as shown above, was preserved by constitutional amendment. 
Consequently, narrowly construing the statute, which intends to preserve this option, in a 
manner that effectively eviscerates the option would appear to be inappropriate. 
Perhaps one reason that a de novo district court review has been so important in 
Utah is because it preserves a constitutional check and balance on tax policy. While 
commissioners have the background to hear tax cases and interpret tax laws, they also 
supervise and administer Utah's tax system and report to the legislature as to legislative 
issues. U.C.A. § 59-1-210(22). These dual roles can create an inherent conflict of 
interest. A de novo review provides an impartial check and balance by the judicial 
branch on the legislative branch of government in Utah. Nullifying the effectiveness of 
appeals from a commission decision to district court would eliminate this important 
check. 
Current statutory procedures, adopted pursuant to constitutional amendment, allow 
both the supreme court (or this Court) and the district court to exercise simultaneous 
jurisdiction over separate appeals from the same commission decision. This is not only 
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what the literal words of the statute say, but it is also what they intend to say. Failing to 
reinstate the county's district court petition would vitiate the county's constitutionally 
preserved and legislatively bestowed option to obtain this district court review. 
IV. ALLOWING THE COUNTY TO ENJOY ITS DISTRICT COURT REVIEW IS 
AN EFFICIENT USE OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES. 
If possible, statutes should be construed in a manner consistent with good public 
policy. Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App 210, U 17, 29 P.3d 
650 ("we look with an eye toward the construction that will achieve the best results in 
practical application, will avoid unacceptable consequences, and will be consistent with 
sound public policy"); Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, f 
29, 123 P.3d 437 ("antitrust laws must be interpreted in light of the strong public policy 
disfavoring anticompetitive practices"). Public policy favors an efficient use of judicial 
resources. Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App 475, ^ 7 , 153 P.3d 768 (the practice of 
automatically transferring cases among judges whenever there are judicial reassignments 
is observed to be an inefficient use of limited judicial resources); Buckner v. Kennard, 
2004 UT 78, T| 17, 99 P.3d 842 (recognizing the "strong public policy favoring arbitration 
as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court 
congestion"). Allowing the county to avail itself of district court review creates 
efficiencies and benefits that public policy supports. 
Section 59-1-601 states, 
(1) In addition to the jurisdictipn granted in Section 63G-4-402, 
beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have jurisdiction to review 
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by trial de novo all decisions issued by the commission after that date 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, 
independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the record. 
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken 
after January 1, 1997, the commission shall certify a record of its 
proceedings to the district court. 
(b) This Subsection (3) supersedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to 
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. 
This statute grants district courts the jurisdiction to review, by trial de novo, all 
Tax Commission decisions. Nevertheless, even though it is a de novo review, subsection 
(3) requires the commission to certify a record of its proceedings to the district court. 
This allows the parties, and the district court, to rely on the record to the extent desired 
and yet to also supplement the record by as much ofade novo presentation of evidence 
as wished. Thus, trials de novo in district court may be, if desired by the parties, fairly 
refined reviews, focusing only on the narrow issues that, in one or another party's view, 
were unsatisfactorily resolved by the commission. This is an efficient and effective way 
to fully distill factual and legal issues before they are decided, on a statewide application, 
by the appellate courts. This brief will first address the benefits of distilling the factual 
issues. Then it will briefly address the benefits of a district court review of legal issues. 
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A. This Court Will Benefit From a Full Distillation of the Facts at Issue. 
The central issue on appeal in this case is the correct valuation methodology to 
apply when taxing a homesite under the Farmland Assessment Act, found in Utah Code 
Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5 (the "FAA"). "The choice of valuation methodology in 
assessing property is a question of fact[, and t]he resulting determination of fair market 
value is also a question of fact." Salt Lake City S.R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 1999 
UT 90, Tj 13, 987 P.2d 594, 598. On direct appeal to an appellate court, the commission's 
findings of fact are reviewed under a "substantial evidence" standard. § 59-l-610(l)(a). 
This standard defers to the facts previously found by the commission, whereas a trial de 
novo—"an original, independent proceeding, and [not] a trial de novo on the record"— 
allows a district court to re-examine those facts afresh. § 59-1-601(2) (emphasis added). 
By affording parties to a Tax Commission formal proceeding the right to independent 
judicial review of that proceeding, and the concomitant right to adduce additional 
evidence before the issues are reviewed by the appellate courts, Utah law gives our courts 
the optimal ability to fully hear and consider the relevant facts before issues are decided 
on the appellate level, where the decision will have statewide effect. In the present case, 
these facts are complex, vastly at variance, and particularly susceptible to district court 
review. 
This case involves the application of the Farmland Assessment Act to a prestigious 
recreational subdivision in Wasatch County. The central factual issue at trial related to 
the value of the one-acre homesites that were removed from the FAA by the construction 
of a primary residence thereon. The evidence at the formal hearing showed that each 
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homesite must be located within a ten-acre building envelope designated by the property 
owner, with some oversight by the homeowners' association. The county submitted 
evidence that 65% of the value of the entire lot is attributable to the one-acre homesite. 
The property owners argued that the value of each homesite was equal to approximately 
0.6% of the value of the entire lot—a difference of two orders of magnitude from the 
county's valuation. 
The commission arrived at a sort of compromise position by concluding that 65% 
of the value of the entire lot is attributable to the ten-acre building envelope in which the 
homesites must be located, and not just the one-acre homesites themselves. It then 
concluded that it had insufficient information to further allocate value within those ten 
acres. Specifically, the commission stated, "As far as allocating a portion of the 65% to 
the one acre [homesite], the Commission is unable to further determine which portion of 
the value is attributable to each acre, other than using 1/10 of the 65% of the total market 
value." Exhibit 1, at 12, J^ 30. Therefore, concluding that it lacked evidence to allocate 
value within each ten-acre building envelope, the commission simply divided 65% by 10 
to arrive at the value of any given acre within that envelope, including the homesite. 
Thus, the commission concluded that the value of each one-acre homesite was 6.5% of 
the value of the entire lot—one order of magnitude less than suggested by the county and 
one order of magnitude greater than suggested by the property owners. 
To the extent that the commission lacked sufficient evidence to accurately allocate 
value to the one-acre homesites within the ten-acre building envelopes, Wasatch County 
has the right to provide that evidence through a de novo review in district court. Where 
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such an enormous difference exists between the parties' evidence—two orders of 
magnitude—and where the commission itself felt that its valuation methodology was 
based on an incomplete understanding of the circumstances, leading it to precisely 
compromise the party's positions, it is consistent with public policy to conserve judicial 
resources by allowing the parties to develop the record as completely as possible before 
this Court settles the question for statewide application. Otherwise, if this Court's ruling 
in the companion case (number 20080304) is perceived to be based on incomplete facts, 
it is unfortunately very likely that the parties will be asking this Court to re-examine the 
issue again after the next tax year is litigated.3 
By authorizing de novo district court review in Article XIII, Section 6, of the Utah 
Constitution, and by affirmatively creating that right in Utah Code Section 59-1-601, the 
people of Utah and their legislature have granted two opportunities to build a record to 
ensure an effective and efficient appeal to the supreme court (or this Court). This Court 
should not ignore this intent by foreclosing the second opportunity. 
B. This Court Will Benefit From an Intermediate Review of the Legal Issues in 
Dispute. 
The legal issues involved in this case also merit examination by the district court 
before this Court resolves them on a state-wide basis. An important issue in the valuation 
of the one-acre homesites involved in this appeal is the appropriate application of the 
relevant statutes in valuing the one-acre homesites under the FAA. 
3
 Tax appeals for the year 2007 from the same subdivision, filed by the same attorneys, 
are already pending but stayed at the Tax Commission, awaiting this Court's resolution of 
the issues in this case and the companion case (number 20080304). 
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The appellees have argued in their appeal (case number 20080304) that the only 
legally valid application of the pertinent statutes requires valuing the one-acre homesites 
by dividing the total lot value by the number of acres in the lot. This is supported by 
Utah Code Section 59-2-102(12), which defines "fair market value" as "the amount at 
which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller." Thus, 
the argument goes, since the one-acre homesites cannot be sold separately from the 160-
acre lots of which they form an indivisible part, they have no fair market value at all. 
Wasatch County argued, and still argues, that applicable statutes do not require 
every acre in the large lots to be valued equally, and that the acre on which the property 
owners' homes sit can be recognized as the most valuable of them all. This argument is 
supported by Utah Code Section 59-2-507(2), of the Farmland Assessment Act, which 
requires "the farmhouse and the land on which the farmhouse is located" to be "valued, 
assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to 
other taxable structures and other land in the county." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the 
argument goes, the county's assessor is required to compare the one-acre homesites to 
similar one-acre homesites and derive a value from that hypothetical comparable. 
The commission, of course, adopted a compromise position not only factually, as 
shown in section IV of this brief, but legally as well. It held that the majority of the value 
of the lot is neither spread equally throughout the lot—as argued by the appellees—nor 
concentrated as entirely within the one-acre homesite as argued by the county. Instead, it 
concluded that the value could be accurately allocated to the ten-acre building envelope 
but could not be accurately allocated within that envelope, at least with the evidence they 
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possessed at the time. This Court can only benefit from a district court's examination of 
this novel issue for which no case precedent currently exists. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Wasatch County asks this Court to reverse the district 
court's dismissal of the county's de novo review and to reinstate that review. 
DATED this / day of November, 2008. 
THOMAS L. LOW 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS/ 
APPELLANTS, WASATCH COUNTY 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing brief, in its bound 
condition, by first class mail, postage prepaid, on the I day of November, 2008, to 
each of the following: £?• 
MAXWELL MILLER 
RANDY GRIMSHAW 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TIMOTHY BODILY 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0874 
Thomas Low, Attorney for Wasatch County 
Petitioners and Appellants 
24 
ADDENDA: 
EXHIBIT 1: Utah State Tax Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decision, issued April 1, 2008. 
EXHIBIT 2: Third District Court's Order Granting Warren and Tricia Osborns' Motion 
to Dismiss, issued August 4, 2008. 
EXHIBIT 3: Utah Code Sections 59-1-601 and 59-1-602 
EXHIBIT 4: Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
25 
EXHIBIT 1 
I BKSvfB—I 
APR C 2 2006 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORN, MICHAEL F. 
SULLI\' AN, DAVID AND CYNTHIA MIRSKY, | 
NORMAN PROVAN, JEFFREY AND NANCY 
TRUMPER, GARY AND CATHERINE 
CRITTENDEN, DAVID CHECKETTS AND 
MOUNT CLYDE ENTERPRISES L C, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH 
COUNTY, UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND FLNAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-
1507, 06-1508. 06-1509, 06-1510 
Tax Type- Property Tax.'Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2006 & Roll Back Period 2001-05 
Judge: Phan 
This Order may contain confidential "commercial information" within the meaning of Utah Code Sec. 59-1-404, 
and is subject to disclosure restrictions as set out in that section and Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37. The rule 
prohibits the parties from disclosing commercial information obtained from the opposing party to nonparties, 
outside of the hearing process. However, pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37 the Tax Commission may 
publish this decision, in its entirety, unless the property taxpayer responds in writing to the Commission, within 
30 days of this order, specifying the commercial information that the taxpayer wants protected. 
Presiding: 
Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
Marc Johnson, Commissioner 
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Max Miller, Attorney at Law 
Randy Grimshaw. Attorney at Law 
Norman Provan, Owner 
Douglas Anderson, Developer 
For Respondent: Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney 
Glen Burgener, Wasatch County Assessor 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on December 
18-19, 2007 Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its-
Appeal Nos 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1509 & 06-1510 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioners are appealing the assessed values as set b\ the Wasatch County Board of 
Equalization for the land on the subject lots, for the 2006 tax year. In addition to the 2006 assessed value, 
Petitioners Sullivan, Mirsky, Crittenden, Provan and Trumper are appealing the rollback tax assessment against 
each of their properties subject to this appeal. 
2. As of the lien date at issue the properties had residences or buildings either constructed or in 
partial states of construction. The value of the buildings was not at issue in this appeal. 
3. The subject properties are all located in the Wolf Creek Subdivision in Wasatch County. The 
owner, parcel number, size and valuations as assessed by Respondent, which are the subject of this appeal, are 
as follows: 
Petitioners Lot/Parcel No. Acres County's Rollback County Board's 2006 
Values Appealed Values Appealed 
No Rollback Land-GreenBelt $ 201,800 
Appeal Land-Homesite $ 550,000 
Warren & Tricia Osborn 61/OWR-4B61 160 
Michael Sullivan 46/OWR-3A46 184 
David & Cynthia Mirsky 53/OWR-4A53 160 
Gary & Catherine 75/OWR-5B75 160 
Crittenden 
Norman Provan 25/OWR-2A25 160 
Jeffrey & Nanc> Trumper 50/OWrR-3A50 160 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,288 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
2002-2006 Land-Greenbelt $1,150,000 
$698,200 per year 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 562.100 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 1,080.000 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 476.800 
$773,200 per year Land-Homesite $ 773,200 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,000 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
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David Checketts & Mount 12 OUR-2012 160 No Rollback Land-Greenbelt $ 201 800 
Clvde Enterprises LC Appeal Land-Homesite $ 845 000 
4 The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision ( Ranch") is an exclusive approved and platted 
subdivision It covers approximate!} 14,000 acres and has 84 single-family home site parcels With the 
exception of a few parcels all home site parcels in the subdiv ision are at least 160 acres All parcels subject to 
this appeal are 160 acres or larger Access to the subdivision is from a main gate at 3480 Bench Creek Road in 
\\ oodland and a secondary gate located off of Lake Creek Road in Heber City Access to the subject lots is 
pro\ ided year round by paved interior roadways, which are maintained by the subdivision 
5 The land uses surrounding the Ranch are primarily recreational and agricultural in nature The 
Ranch shares approximately seven miles of common boarder with the Uinta National Forest on the east, which 
is accessible from the Ranch Jordanelle Reservoir is ten miles west and Rockport State Park and Reservoir 20 
miles north Park City with its ski and summer resorts is located approximately 22 miles northwest 
6 The subdivision amenities at the Ranch include a 26-acre common area with an equestrian 
center and stables, a 2 800 square foot guesthouse and two large trout stocked ponds There is another 23-acre 
common area with tepees, fire pits, campground areas, corrals and approximately one-mile of frontage along 
the Upper Provo River There are several yurts at the property that can be accessed by the residents There is 
approximately fifty miles of equestrian trails through the ranch and the entire property is protected by private 
security 
7 Although each subject parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one single-
family home site 
8. The limitations on development are both from zoning and a conservation easement The 
property is zoned P-160 under the jurisdiction of Wasatch Countv P-160 ib a preservation zoning where 
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development may be limited do to remoteness of services, topography and other sensiti\e environmental issues. 
Residential development is allowed in the zoning with basically one residence per 160 acres. Conditional uses 
include groupings of residential lots provided that density is not increased, water storage, fishing acti\ ities and 
sand and gravel quarrying. 
9. The principal developer of the Ranch, Douglas Anderson, testified that the area had been 
ranched for over ont hundred years and it was the uitent in developing the Ranch to preserve large amounts of 
open space and continue the ranching tradition. As there was the possibly that zoning could be changed and 
higher density allowed at some point in the future by the County or other governmental jurisdiction, to insure 
the restrictions remained permanently, they placed conservation easements on the property as it was 
subdivided. The conservation easements were granted to the Utah Open Lands Conservation Association, Inc. 
As such the subject lots are permanently encumbered by the conservation easements. The conservation 
easements allow for one-home site with the improvements specifically limited to the 10-acre building envelope. 
Within the 10-acre building envelope the property owner may construct both a primary single-family residence 
and a caretaker residence. A garage and other barns and outbuildings may be constructed. All the buildings 
must be located within the ten-acre envelope as well as any roadways, utility lines; water wells water storage 
tanks, waterlines and septic tanks. The 10-acre building area may not be located in wildlife birthing areas, 
goshawk nesting habitats or riparian areas. The conservation easement would permanently prohibit buildings 
or other improvements on the acres outside of the 10-acre building envelope. Further, there could be no 
quarrying or mining on the property. 
10. Subject to some restrictions, that included specified habits and riparian areas or the County 
building requirements regarding slope and setbacks, the purchaser chooses which ten contiguous acres to use 
for the building envelope, and then chooses the home site within those acres. Norman Provan, an owner of one 
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of the subject lots, and Mr. Anderson both testified that not only could the homeowners choose the site of the 
building envelope it was possible to move the building envelope at least until construction commenced, and 
even then there was some possibility of adjustment as long as it encompassed the buildings. Mr. Andersen 
testified that typically the location of the building envelope was limited only by Count}' building restrictions. 
During the period now subject to the rollback, the 10-acre building envelopes had not yet been designated. 
Based on these factors the Commission finds that during the rollback period there was no specific one-acre of 
the property designated as the home site or ten acres designated as the building envelope. 
11. Mr. Provan, an owner of one of the subject lots testified that he purchased the lot because of 
size and restrictions on development. He indicated he chose the property over other subdivisions because he 
liked that all 14,000 acres would be preserved with the same restrictions and remain as a wilderness setting. 
He also felt he was doing something good by preserving open space. Another owner, Mike Sullivan testified 
that they purchased the property because they wanted the large acreage and a place to ride their horses. It was 
his understanding that the restrictions on the property made it so that each lot could not be subdivided. 
12. As the property had been ranched for many years it had been assessed under the Farmland 
Assessment Act (UF AA") for property tax purposes, based on its agricultural use, rather than its market value. 
Agricultural use continues over most of the Ranch property as of the date of the hearing as the Homeowners 
Association leases the Ranch property out to a sheep operation. A property owner may fence their 10-acre 
building envelope to keep the sheep out of that portion of the property, but must allow sheep to graze on the 
remaining acreage. As of the lien date, none of the Petitioners had chosen to fence their 10-acre building 
envelopes and have allowed the sheep to graze throughout their properties. The Count} had assessed these 
properties with the entire parcel valued as greenbelt property under the FAA even after the subdivision was 
platted, up until the time a building permit v\as issued. Once a building permit was taken out on a particular 
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parcel the County removed the one-acre home site from valuation under the FAA and that one-acre became 
subject to the roll back tax. However, the County considered the other 159-acres or more on each parcel to 
remain as greenbelt and the County continues to assess the remaining acres under the FAA. 
13. The FAA requires disparate treatment regarding the home site and remaining acres that are 
ranched or farmed. Pursuant to the FAA. the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is not 
taxed under the act, but is instead assessed based on fair market value. For greenbelt properties located outside 
of city limits, Wasatch County applies a standard of one as the land used in connection with the farmhouse, or 
home site. 
14. As there had been sales of lots in the Ranch, there was market information to determine a fair 
market value for each parcel at issue. The reason the matter came before the Commission for the Formal 
Hearing was that the parties were in disagreement on how much of the total value of the 160-acre parcels 
should be attributed to the one-acre home sites. A determination of the value for the one-acre is relevant for 
the purposes of determining the amount of the rollback, as well as for the assessment for the 2006-year. 
15. W7hen the County issued the Tax Notices for the years that are now subject to the rollback, the 
notices did not list out or allocate a portion of the total market value to either the home site acre or the building 
envelope. Instead, the notices listed a single, total market value for the entire parcels. Because the property 
was taxed as greenbelt under the FAA, the amount of the tax assessed, however, was not based on the market 
value, but instead on the greenbelt value pursuant to the FAA. 
16. Petitioners submitted an appraisal for each of the properties at issue, which had been prepared 
by Philip Cook, MAI, and CRE. Mr. Cook's appraisal was limited to a market valuation of the land only. It 
was Mr. Cook's appraisal conclusion that there was some variation in values between the lots, due to factors 
like view, slope and forestation. It was his appraisal conclusion that the total market value of the land for each 
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of the parcels at issue, as of January 1. 2006, was as follows: 
Lot 12 $1,350,000 
Lot 25 51,340,000 
Lot 46 $1,410,000 
Lot 50 $1,715,000 
Lot 53 $1,285,000 
Lot 61 $1,715,000 
Lot 75 $1,850,000 
17. Mr. Cook's market values for each subject parcel were not substantially disputed by 
Respondent Mr Cook's market value conclusions for the land were based on eleven lot sales, all located 
within the Ranch. The sales had occurred from October 2004 through May 2006. The lots had sold for prices 
ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,800,000. 
18. In his appraisal Mr Cook also gave his opinion of how the total value should be allocated to 
the various components of the lot, including the one-acre home site. It was his position that allocations to the 
functional areas of each lot must reflect the market value and he indicated there were circumstances when a 
separate value for a home site consisting as part of a larger parcel could be determined. However, it was his 
conclusion that in this matter, any allocation of the total purchase price of the lot to the home site was simply 
not market supported. He reached this conclusion because the 160 acres could not be subdivided and with the 
restrictions from zoning and conservation easements the highest and best use of the subject lots were as large 
160-acre single family lots He pointed to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and 
indicates that they specifically warn against allocating value without market support.1 It was his opinion that 
the County had apportioned the values to the various components of the lots arbitrarily It was Mr. Cook's 
conclusion that if it is necessary to allocate or apportion part of the total lot value to the home site acre, it could 
onlv be done pro rata, 1 160th of the total value, as it is the entire lot and the similarity to all other lots within 
I Mr Cook cites to Lniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisorv Opinions 2006 Edition, Appraisal 
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the development that create the value. 
19. David A. Thomas. Professor of Law, testified that the zoning and conservation easement had 
to be taken into account in determining the value. It was his opinion that it was not legal to buy or sell any 
portion of the lot smaller than the total 160 acres. This was a point that was supported by all evidence and not 
disputed. It was Professor Thomas' conclusion that because one acre could not be sold separately, there was 
no fair market value for the one-acre home site, only a value for the property as a whole. Professor Thomas 
also pointed out that additional value will be taxed in the improvements. 
20. Robert Crawford, PhD, testified that the conservation easement actually enhanced the value of 
the property. He also testified that the highest and best use of the property was not for agriculture, it was 
instead as a 160-acre residential building lot. As part of the whole he concluded that each acre of the 160-acre 
property had the same value as all the other acres. He stated that a fair market value for the one-acre home site 
could be determined but only on the basis of 1/160 of the total value as indicated by Mr. Cook. It was Dr. 
Crawford's conclusion that recognizing an allocated valuation method to all the acres is economically valid as 
it the way of expressing the enhanced value of the whole. The right to build a residence somewhere on the 
property presumably increase the value of the 160 acre lot. That will be reflected in the price per acre. He did 
not find an extracted market value using lots similar in size that have sold to be a valid valuation technique. 
21. Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified that under the FAA, the County is 
required to allocate a portion of the total value to the home site acre, which is subject to tax on a fair market 
value basis, while the remainder of the property was taxable under greenbelt. He testified that he had been 
applying the FAA to properties for seventeen years in Wastatch County. The County had farms with home 
sites on numerous properties of varying zones where the County is required to allocate a portion of the total 
Standards Board. The \ppratsal Foundation, Standards Rule I-4(e) Comment 
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value to the home site. In addition to farms in the P-160 zone, there were farms with home sites on properties 
in the following zones: A-20 allowing onl> 1 residence per 20 acres ; R-A-5 allowing onl> one residence per 5 
acres; R-A-1 allowing onl> one residence per 1 -acre. To establish a value for the home site, the County would 
consider values of buildable lots in the area. It was the County's position that the right to build a residence is 
part of the home site valufe. 
22. In 1999, when the subject lots were platted and because of the conservation easement, Mr. 
Burgener sought advise from representatives of the State Tax Commission's Property Tax Division on how to 
allocate the total values of the property. At this time, the County made the determination that the total value, 
which was based on the sales, would be allocated 60% to the primary residential buildable site, 22% to the 
secondary or caretaker's buildable site, $25,000 per acre to the rest of the acres in the building envelope and 
whatever was left of the market value to the remaining acres. It was the County's position that a substantial 
portion of the value of the remaining 150-acres shifted to the 10 acres building envelope due to the 
conservation easement. However, this valuation break out was not conveyed to the property owners on the 
annual Tax Notices issued for the years that are now subject to the rollback. 
23. Blaine D. Hales, Certified General Appraiser, prepared an appraisal for the Respondent for 
purposes of estimating the value of the one-acre home site on the property. The appraisal was prepared for one 
lot, Lot 75, which was the Crittenden property. It was the County's intent that the same methodolog} for 
determining the value for the home site be applied to the other properties It was Mr Hales conclusion that the 
total value of Lot 75 was 51,800,000, of which $1,200,000 was for the one-acre home site and $600,000 for 
the reaming 159 acres. 
24. In his appraisal, Mr. Hales determined the value of the one-acre site by estimating the overall 
value of the entire parcel and using additional data to allocate or estimate the v alue contributed bv the one-acre 
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home site to the overall parcel It was his conclusion that he could determine a fair allocation of the market 
value, despite that the one acre could not be legally sold separately. 
25 Like Mr. Cook. Mr. Hales' estimate of the total market value came from sales within the 
Ranch, all located very near Lot 75. He also considered the purchase price of Lot 75, which was $1,800,000 
on October 29, 2004. It was his conclusion that the fair market value of the land only on Lot 75, as of the 
January 1, 2006 lien date, was $1,800,000. As a comparison, Mr. Cook had valued this lot at $1,850,000. 
26. To determine a value for the one acre home site, it was Mr. Hales position that the building 
site, when reduced to one acre, must also include the legal right to construct a home because the appraiser must 
be careful to divide both the physical and legal components of the property. He attributed the right to build to 
the one acre while the remaining 159 acres he considered to have only the limited agricultural and recreational 
uses. 
27. To estimate the allocation to the one acre, Mr Hales relied on two methods: 1) determining the 
value of the unbuildable portion of the property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build by 
considering sales of conservation easements. To determine the value of the unbuildable land, Mr. Hales found 
six comparables of rangeland with recreational desirability, but without the right for potential residential 
development. He concluded that these sales indicated a value for the unbuildable portion of the property to be 
$500,000. In this analysis, Mr. Hales indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and only the one-
acre, used by the County as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of conservation easements he relied 
on six sales and concluded that the right to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would 
represent approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be allocated to the unbuildable 
agricultural and recreational land. In his reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the 
total value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to the agricultural land 
- 1 0 -
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28. Upon review of ail the evidence in this matter, the Commission concludes that prior to 
designation of the 10-acre building envelope, as evidenced by the issuance of a building permit, there would be 
no distinction in value from one acre to the next for the 160 acre parcels, as the right to build was attached to 
the value of the entire lot as a whole and each acre up to the 160 acres contributed equally to the value. 
29. Hov\ever, once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, the value is no longer 
equally contributed on a per acre basis. All development and improvement must be limited to the ten acres. 
The right to build attaches to the building envelope. Furthermore, the restrictions of the conservation easement 
are then attached to the now identifiable 150 acres. The owner may no longer build fences, roadwavs, corrals, 
swimming pools, manmade ponds or gardens on the 150 acres. Once the building envelope has been 
established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre building envelope and the remainder of 
the property, a difference that does impact how these two portions of property contribute to the value. 
30. Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately from the 
159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express language 
of the F AA. Mr. Hales was the only party who attempted to do this in a manner that reflects the reality that the 
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation easement. Absent 
evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales 
conclusion that 65% of the value of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land. 
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is ten-acres. From a review of Mr. 
Hales* appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre building site and that of the other witnesses 
describing the potential for the 10-acre envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable 
portion applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home site. Nine of the 
ten buildable acres as of the lien date were still being used for agricultural purposes and one acre must be 
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valued as the home site according to statute As far as allocating a portion of the 65° o to the one-acre, the 
Commission is unable to further determine which portion of the value is attributable to each acre, other than 
using 1/10 of the 65% of the total market value. 
31. Mr. Cook has appraised each individual lot at issue in this appeal to determine a total value as 
of the January 1, 2006 lien date. The County's assessments for 2006 were not always consistent with Mr 
Cook's conclusions. The Countv did not substantially refute Mr. Cook's total values for each lot, and the 
County did not submit an appraisal of each lot. For tax year 2006, the Commission accepts Mr. Cook's total 
lot value for the land portion of each of the subject properties. The Commission finds the value of the 10- acre 
building envelope to be 65% of the total lot value, and the one-acre home site value to be 1/10 of the 65% 
attributed to the building envelope. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the 
basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provide by law. (2) Beginning January 
15 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential 
exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
103.) 
2. ''Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts For purposes of taxation, ufair market value'' shall be determined 
using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable 
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the change 
would have an appreciable influence upon the value (Utah Code Sec 59-2-102(12).) 
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3. For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the value that the land 
has for agricultural use if the land: (a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area. . . and (b) except as 
provided in Subsection )5): (i) is actively devoted to agricultural use: and (ii) has been activelv devoted to 
agricultural use for at least tvvo successive years immediately preceding the tax year for which the land is being 
assessed under this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-503(1).) 
4. All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on 
which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and 
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land 
in the county. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507(2).) 
5. (2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the fair market 
value assessment shall be included on the notices described in (a) Subsection 59-2-919(4); and (b) Section 59-
2-1317. (3)The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value and fair market value 
assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-505 (2)&(3).) 
6. Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5 or Section 59-2-511, if land is 
withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a roll back tax imposed in accordance with this section. (Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-506(1).) 
7. The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by computing the 
difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) between: (i) the tax paid wile the land was 
assessed under this part; and (ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed under 
this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506(3).) 
8. Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization concerning the 
assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any exemption in which the person has an 
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interest, may appeal that decision to the commission by filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the 
appeal w ith the county auditor within 30 day s after the final action of the county board. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
1006(1).) 
9. (2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to a minimum 
parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as part of the assessment: (a) that the parcel of 
property may not be subdivided into parcels of property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and (b) any 
effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the parcel of property. (3) This section does not 
prohibit a county assessor from including as part of an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of 
property any other factor affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2(2) & (3).) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner has raised two separate but related issues. The first is whether the value of a home 
site contained within a larger and unsubdividable property may be retroactively established at the time of 
assessment of a rollback tax. The second is the fair market value of the existing home site for purposes of 
determining the current year's property tax assessment. To begin, a determination of the rollback tax presents 
issues of both fact and law to the Commission. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506 the amount of the 
rollback tax is computed by taking the difference between the tax paid during the roll back period based on its 
agricultural use under the FAA and the tax that would have been paid annually based on an a fair market value 
assessment. For each year of the rollback period, the County on an annual basis had already determined the 
fair market value for the subject property. Furthermore, the County was required to list the fair market value 
on the Tax Valuation Notices as they were issued each year. If Petitioners were in disagreement with the 
market value set by the County. Petitioners' recourse was to appeal the market value each year as prov ided in 
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Sec 59-2-1001 Therefore, the total fair market value for each property at issue for the rollback years was 
already established b> the County pursuant to the annual notices they issued that were not appealed and may 
not now be challenged by either party based on the circumstances in this matter. 
2. Respondent's witnesses acknowledged, and it was supported by the exhibits and testimony of 
Petitioners' witnesses, that when the County listed the fair market value on the annual notices mailed out for 
the years subject to the rollback, it listed only a total value for the entire 160-acre parcel without any breakout 
for home site land. Petitioners did not file annual appeals regarding the total market value indicated on the 
notices for each of the rollback years. Petitioners were not given the opportunity to challenge the County's 
allocation of the total market value to the home site acre, because they were never given notice of what that 
amount was. Had Petitioners been notified of the allocation to the home site acre, and that it was an amount 
different from a 1/160 allocation of the total value, Petitioners may have appealed the value on annual basis as 
is provided in the statute at Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. 
3. Furthermore, the Commission notes that for rollback purposes, valuation is based on the 
property, as it existed during the rollback period. Valuation is not based on the condition of the property that 
results after a portion has been withdrawn from greenbelt. The Commission finds that if the County valued the 
home site at a higher rate during the rollback years, the County should have indicated so annually on its 
valuation notices as they were issued for each of those years, so that the home site value could have been 
appealed annually pursuant to Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. Failure to do so alone is sufficient 
for the Commission to fipd that rollback tax is limited to 1/160th 2 of the total value listed by the County each 
year in its valuation notices issued to Petitioners. Additionally, this legal basis is supported by the 
Commission's factual conclusion that during the rollback period, there were no designated building envelopes 
2 For Lot 46 which was 184 acres the rollback tax must be based on 1 184th of the total value 
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or home sites and. therefore, each one of the 160 acres was as valuable as the rest. Prior to the issuance of the 
building permit there would ha\e been no basis for the Count} to determine the one-acre home site upon which 
the residence would be located. 
4. With respect to the second issue, the question of the current home site value, it is the 
Commission's conclusion that the issue of determining the market value of the one-acre home site for the 2006 
lien date presents both legal and factual issues. Petitioners' witness, Dr. Thomas, argued that a market value 
could not be determined for the one acre as it could not be legally separated. Petitioners also argue that Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-301.2 regarding minimum parcel size supports their contention. Although the one-acre home 
site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair 
market value and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in connection with 
greenbelt property. Subsection 507(2) provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection with the 
farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to 
other taxable land and structures in the County. However, the subsection does not provide specific guidance 
on how to make that determination when the home site is part of an unsubdividable lot. Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2 does prohibit the County from valuing the 160-acre subject parcels as if they were subdividable into 
numerous single-family residential lots. The County has not valued this property as if higher density was 
allowed. Furthermore, subsection 59-2-301.2 (3) expressly provides that the County Assessor may include as 
part of the assessment other factors affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. Finally, the fact 
that Mr. Cook's valuations differ based on specific properly characteristics, in addition to size, implicit!} 
demonstrates that the value of any given unit of land may vary from another within each lot. 
5. The Commission finds that each acre of the 160- acre parcel contributes to value. Prior to the 
designation of the building envelope this was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable envelope was 
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designated, as had occurred for all properties subject to this appeal bv the 2006 lien date, there are two distinct 
and identifiable classes of property the 10 acre building en\elope and the remaining undevelopable area 
covered b\ the conservation easement. These two areas do not contribute equallv to the value Respondent has 
offered an appraisal that makes a distinction. Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the 
analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable with the possibility of a second home, 
garages, barns, outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the building site, 
the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis 
adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable envelope for these properties. 
6. As of the lien date, only one acre of the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from 
greenbelt for each of these properties. As additional improvements are made in the buildable envelope, 
additional acreage may be withdrawn and rollback assessed. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the County is to calculate the 
rollback taxes for each of the properties for each rollback year based on the market value for the home site acre 
being 1/160th or 1/184th' depend ing on the size of the lot, of the total value indicated for that vear on the tax 
notices issued by the County. The County is to calculate the fair market value of the home site acre for the 
2006 tax year for each parcel at issue on the basis of 65% of the total value of the lot as determined in the Cook 
appraisal divided by 10. It is so ordered. The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as 
appropriate in compliance with this order. 
DATED this / day of C^Z/l^i^£^ 2008. 
Jan(g Phan ' 
Administrative Law Judge 
Appeal Nos 06-1504. 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1509 & 06-1510 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this / da> of £^*<2^£^!> 2008 
(Xyvu 
Pam Hendnckson 
Commission Chai 
Marc B Johns 
Commissioner 
EXCUSED 
R Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
D'Arcy Dixon Pi 
Commissioner 
0Tv 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-13 A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not 
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have 
thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code 
Sec 59-1-601 et seq and 63-46b-13 et seq. 
JKP06-1504fofdoc 
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Attorneys for the Warren and Tricia Osbom 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH COUNTY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING WARREN AND 
TRICIA OSBORNS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 080907392 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Tax Commission Appeals Nos.: 06-1504, 
06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-
1509,06-1510 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on: (1) Warren and Tricia Osborns' 
Motion to Intervene ("Motion to Intervene") and (2) Warren and Tricia Osborns' Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Include Multiple Indispensable Parties ("Motion to Dismiss") on July 14, 
2008, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding. Appearing on behalf of Petitioner Wasatch 
County was Wasatch County Attorney Thomas L. Lowe. Appearing on behalf on the Utah State 
Tax Commission was Assistant Utah Attorney General Timothy A. Bodily. Appearing on behalf 
•LED DISTRICT COURT 
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AUG 0 h 2003 
of the Osborns were Maxwell A. Miller and Matthew D. Cook of Parsons Behle & Latimer. 
Neither Wasatch County nor the Utah State Tax Commission objected to the Osborns' 
participation in the proceeding. 
At the end of the July 14, 2008 argument, the Court granted Wasatch County and the 
Utah State Tax Commission the opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing the argument 
asserted by Warren and Tricia Osborn (the "Osborns") that once an aggrieved party has 
exercised its statutory option to appeal a decision of the Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) by invoking the jurisdiction of the court of its choice, the court wherein a 
subsequent attempt to invoke jurisdiction is made lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The 
parties, respectively, each filed supplemental briefs on the issue of the election of remedies. Oral 
argument on the supplemental pleadings was held before the Court on July 28, 2008. 
Upon consideration of the record, memoranda, arguments made, and being fully advised 
in the premises, the Court enters the following Order granting the Osborns' Motion to Dismiss as 
follows: 
1. The Osborns have standing to file a Motion to Dismiss. 
2. The Osborns and other property owners who were parties in the Tax Commission 
proceeding, Warren and Tricia Osborn et al v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1510, filed a Petition for Review 
of the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision dated April 
1, 2008 (the "Final Decision"), with the Utah Supreme Court on April 10, 2008, as Case No. 
2008034 SC. 
2 
3. On April 24, 2008, Wasatch County filed its Cross-Petition for Review of the 
Utah State Tax Commission's Final Decision with the Utah Supreme Court in the same case, 
Case No. 20080304 SC. Subsequently, on April 25, 2008, Wasatch County filed its Petition for 
Review of the Decision in this Court, as Case No. 080907392 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 provides that "any aggrieved party appearing before 
the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision," including Wasatch 
County, has the "option" of filing a petition for review in the district court "or" in the Supreme 
Court. Wasatch County exercised its statutory option pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
602(a)(1) by invoking the jurisdiction of the court of its choice, the Utah Supreme Court, by 
filing its Cross-Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008. 
Consequently, Wasatch County's subsequent attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by 
filing its Petition for Review on April 25, 2008 failed to invoke this Court's jurisdiction and was 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. •§ 59-1-602(a)(1). Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
adjudicate Wasatch County's subsequently filed appeal with this Court, it retains jurisdiction 
only to dismiss Wasatch County's Petition for Review. For the reasons stated above, the 
Osborns' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and Wasatch County's Petition for Review filed in 
this Court on April 25, 2008 is hereby dismissed. 
5. The Court further cites to Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission, which provides: 
Salt Lake County did not expressly waive (as our statute 
contemplates that it should) its right of access to the Third Judicial 
District Court for the relief it seeks here. We treat the omission as 
a pleading deficiency of the kind to which the pleader's adversary 
must make timely objection or the right to object is waived. (fh6) 
In this connection, it is significant that the County's power to tax is 
3 
not dependent on the above cited statute; the statute merely 
regulates the exercise of that power. The statute does not 
undertake to remove the review of Commission decisions from the 
jurisdiction of this Court, it merely states a condition which an 
applicant for review is obligated to satisfy 
Salt Lake County v Tax Commission, 596 P.2d 641, 644 (Utah 1979). 
The Court finds, pursuant to the above cited case, that Osborns have timely objected to 
Wasatch County's filing of duplicative appeals; therefore their right to object has not been 
waived. 
Timothy A. Bodily, Utaih Assistant Attorney General 
Thomas L. Lowe. Wasatch County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 29, 2008, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER GRANTING WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORNS' MOTION TO INTERVENE 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS to the following parties: 
Timothy Bodily, Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Utah State Tax Commission 
160 East 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney 
Counsel for Wasatch County 
805 West 100 South 
Heber City, UT 84032 
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EXHIBIT 3 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
59-1-601. District court jurisdiction. 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63G-4-402, beginning July 1, 1994, 
the district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the 
commission after that date resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent proceeding, 
and does not mean a trial de novo on the record. 
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken after January 1, 
1997, the commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the district court. 
(b) This Subsection (3) supercedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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59-1-602. Right to appeal -- Venue - County as party in interest. 
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county whose tax 
revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's option petition for judicial review in 
the district court pursuant to this section, or in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 59-1-610 
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in the district is in the 
district court located in the county of residence or principal place of business of the affected 
taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review made to the district court 
under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being reviewed shall be 
allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the court. 
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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EXHIBIT 4 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; intervention. 
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order or decision of an administrative agency, 
board, commission, committee, or officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, 
board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then 
within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. The petition shall specify the 
parties seeking review and shall designate the respondent(s) and the order or decision, or part 
thereof, to be reviewed. In each case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah 
shall be deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated in the 
petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the same order and their 
interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint petition for review and 
may thereafter proceed as a single petitioner. 
(b) Filing fees. At the time of filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall 
pay to the clerk of the appellate court the filing fee established by law. The clerk shall not accept 
a petition for review unless the filing fee is paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by the petitioner on the 
named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the 
Attorney General of Utah, if the state is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The 
petitioner, at the time of filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the 
appellate court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding who have 
been served. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under this rule shall serve 
upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties who participated before the agency, and 
file with the clerk of the appellate court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain 
a concise statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which intervention 
is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 days of the date on which the 
petition for review is filed. 
